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Article 
The Dakota Access Pipeline and the Destruction 
of Cultural Heritage: Applying the Crime Against 
Humanity of Persecution Before the ICC 
Haydee J. Dijkstal 
Abstract 
The controversy surrounding the Dakota Access Pipeline 
has included claims by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe that sites of religious and cultural 
significance including burial grounds are directly in the 
pipeline’s planned route and would be destroyed by construction. 
This article aims to determine whether construction of the 
Dakota Access Pipeline violates international human rights and 
criminal law, and could leave corporation officials most 
responsible for the pipeline construction and operation 
vulnerable to investigation or prosecution for the crime against 
humanity of persecution before the International Criminal 
Court. The article examines how human rights law and the case 
law of international tribunals establish that the destruction of 
cultural property can constitute the denial of a fundamental 
right rising to the level of persecution as a crime against 
humanity. Examining the decision of the International Criminal 
Court to, for the first time, investigate and prosecute the 
destruction of cultural heritage, such as tombs and Mausoleums 
in Mali, as a war crime, the article sets out how the destruction 
of cultural property outside of an armed conflict could be 
pursued as a crime against humanity. The article concludes that 
there is a strong case to argue that the pipeline’s construction 
would fit within the definition of a crime against humanity of 
persecution before the ICC, leaving corporation officials within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC vulnerable to a complaint and action 
 
  Haydee Dijkstal is an attorney practicing international criminal and 
human rights law. 
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before the ICC. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Instances where cultural heritage is threatened or 
destroyed in times of peace often particularly affect indigenous 
peoples.1 For Native American tribes in the United States, sites 
and objects which are of cultural significance and importance are 
increasingly under threat as a result of commercial development 
ventures and interests.2 
This issue has been raised in regards to both the Dakota 
Access Pipeline and the Keystone Pipeline, where the 
construction and subsequent operation of both pipelines 
threaten the destruction, or have already destroyed, sites of 
cultural heritage and importance such as ancestral graves, and 
sites and objects of religious and cultural significance.3 After it 
was reported on November 16, 2017 that 210,000 gallons of oil 
spilled during the operation of the Keystone Pipeline in South 
Dakota near the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation of 
the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe,4 a US District Court 
recognized that the Dakota Access Pipeline presents a similar 
risk to the land of several tribes, including the Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, whose land 
runs along the path of the pipeline, and that ongoing monitoring 
of the risks posed by the pipeline is required.5 Similarly, the 
 
 1. See Karima Bennoune: Cultural Heritage is a Human Rights Issue, 
HAKAM (Oct. 25, 2016), https://hakam.org.my/wp/2016/10/25/karima-bennoune-
cultural-heritage-is-a-human-rights-issue/. 
 2. Steve Dubb, Native Americans Face Environmental Threats from 
Alaska to New Mexico, NPQ (Oct. 9, 2017), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
2017/10/09/native-americans-face-environmental-threats-alaska-new-mexico/. 
 3. See, e.g., infra pp. 163–68; Steven Mufson & Chris Mooney, Keystone 
Pipeline Spills 210,000 Gallons of Oil on Eve of Permitting Decision for 
TransCanada, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/16/keystone-pipeline-spills-210000-
gallons-of-oil-on-eve-of-key-permitting-decision; Valerie Volcovici & Richard 
Valdmanis, Keystone’s Existing Pipeline Spills Far More Than Predicted to 
Regulators, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017, 6:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-pipeline-keystone-spills/keystones-existing-pipeline-spills-far-more-
than-predicted-to-regulators-idUSKBN1DR1CS. 
 4. See, e.g., Mitch Smith & Julie Bosman, Keystone Pipeline Leaks 210,000 
Gallons of Oil in South Dakota, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/us/keystone-pipeline-leaks-south-
dakota.html. 
 5. Memorandum Opinion at 5, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 280 F.Supp.3d 187 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-1534 (JEB)). 
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recent actions to revoke and replace the Bear Ears Monument, 
and the protections covering large areas containing “hundreds of 
thousands of objects of historic and scientific importance, many 
traditional cultural properties, and many sacred sites” prompted 
the Hope Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute Indian Tribe, Ute Mountain 
Ute Tribe, and Zuni Tribe to take civil action alleging that the 
removed protections opens these lands up to private oil and gas 
development which could cause “significant and irreversible 
damage to this culturally important landscape.”6 
The ICC set an important precedent that individuals who 
are most responsible for the destruction of cultural heritage 
could be held criminally responsible under international law for 
the commission of a war crime with the International Criminal 
Court’s recent conviction of Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi, an alleged 
member of the militant group Ansar Eddine, for “intentionally 
attacking” historic monuments and buildings dedicated to 
religion such as mausoleums and a mosque.7 
This article focuses on events regarding the construction 
and operation of the Dakota Access Pipeline and considers 
instances where objects and sites of cultural significance and 
importance have been threatened or destroyed. For the purpose 
of analysis, the article focuses, as a means of example or case 
study, on one documented instance where allegations have been 
made that cultural heritage was destroyed in South Dakota by 
construction efforts on the pipeline.8 The article will examine 
these events through the lens of international criminal law to 
consider whether actions by the corporations involved in the 
construction of the pipeline, which led to the destruction and 
irreparable damage of cultural and religious heritage sites to the 
Tribes, could be investigated and prosecuted before the ICC 
when the destruction of these sites occurs outside of an armed 
conflict. 
The article demonstrates how the Rome Statute similarly 
allows for the destruction of cultural heritage to be addressed by 
the Court when it occurs outside of an armed conflict by 
examining the decision of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to investigate and prosecute, for the first time, the 
destruction of cultural heritage in Mali as a war crime. The 
 
 6. Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Relief at 45, Hopi 
Tribe, v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02590 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017). 
 7. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, Judgment and Sentence, 
¶ 64 (Sept. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Al-Mahdi Judgment]. 
 8. Infra pp. 163–68. 
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article proposes that Article 7 of the Rome Statute allows for the 
destruction or damage of cultural heritage outside of an armed 
conflict to be pursued as a crime against humanity of 
persecution. 
In order to make this determination, the article will first 
review the background of the sites of cultural and religious 
heritage which were either destroyed or damaged by 
construction of the pipeline. Second, the article will review the 
development of protections for cultural property and heritage 
under international law which has become part of customary 
international law. Third, the article will describe the case law of 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
which has demonstrated a clear practice of applying individual 
criminal responsibility for the destruction of cultural property 
and heritage as a crime against humanity of persecution. 
Considering that this application of the crime against humanity 
of persecution before the ICTY concerned only instances of 
destruction and damage during an armed conflict, the article 
will examine the required elements for a crime against 
humanity of persecution committed during times of peace under 
the Rome Statute. While the article will set out the contextual 
elements required for proving the commission of a crime against 
humanity of persecution, the focus of it will remain on how the 
underlying crime of persecution can be applied to situations 
where cultural heritage is damage or destroyed during times of 
peace. 
The article will conclude that the destruction and damage of 
cultural heritage can be considered an underlying act for the 
crime of persecution as a crime against humanity before the ICC, 
and that there is a strong case to argue that the pipeline’s 
construction would fit within the definition of a crime against 
humanity of persecution before the ICC. 
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
This article considers the question of whether instances 
during the construction and operation of the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, which resulted in the destruction of cultural heritage, 
could constitute a crime against humanity of persecution under 
the Rome Statute. The analysis that follows considers only the 
definition and application of a crime against humanity of 
persecution under Article 7 of the Rome Statute with an in-depth 
analysis of the required preliminary issues which must be 
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considered before a particular prosecution or investigation can 
be initiated; namely jurisdiction and gravity. 
While this article’s primary aim is to provide an analysis of 
the application of the crime against humanity to an instance of 
destruction of cultural heritage without making a conclusion on 
the likelihood of an investigation or prosecution into the events 
concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline, this paper is not 
presented merely in the abstract. The issues of jurisdiction and 
gravity are hurdles which will be considered, crossed, and 
possibly be met. A cursory look indicates that they are. 
 Jurisdiction before the ICC would affect the practical ability 
of the ICC to address the events surrounding the Dakota Access 
Pipeline. Because the United States is not a member of the Rome 
Statute, the Court would not have jurisdiction to investigate and 
prosecute crimes taking place on its territory unless the United 
States voluntarily lodged an Article 12(3) declaration to accept 
the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the crimes, or if the UN 
Security Council took a decision to refer the crimes to the ICC as 
a matter affecting peace and security under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.9 As the US is not likely to voluntarily subject itself 
to the jurisdiction of the ICC anytime soon, and the UN Security 
Council would be unlikely to find that the events concerning the 
pipeline are a threat to peace and security, the other option for 
achieving jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the suspect 
or accused. Article 12(2)(b) of the Rome Statute grants 
jurisdiction over crimes where the suspect or accused is a 
national of a State Party to the Statute.10 It is possible that 
corporate officials responsible for ownership or construction of 
the pipeline who are nationals of an ICC member State could fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Court, and be held individually 
criminally responsible.11 
The gravity of the potential cases which would arise before 
the ICC must also be noted as a hurdle which must be addressed 
before any movement could practically be made with an 
investigation or prosecution on this topic before the ICC. As an 
issue regarding the admissibility, an assessment of whether 
these cases would meet the gravity threshold under Article 
 
 9. U.N. Charter art. 39–51. 
 10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.12, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 11. See How the Court Works, ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-
court-works (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
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53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute12 considers “the scale, nature, and 
manner of commission of the crimes, and their impact, bearing 
in mind the potential cases that would be likely to arise from an 
investigation of the situation.”13 
In the Al-Mahdi case, the Prosecution found sufficient 
gravity in regard to the destruction of religious and historical 
sites based on these factors. In short, the scale of the potential 
crimes was demonstrated by a “series of attacks” against 
significant sites,14 and the nature of the crimes was affected 
because the Prosecution found the events affect sites and objects 
“whose value transcends geographical boundaries, and which 
are unique in character and are intimately associated with the 
history and culture of the people.”15 The manner of the 
commission of the crimes was affected by the repeated instances 
of destruction and the impact of the crimes was demonstrated 
because they “shocked the conscience of humanity.”16 
A similar analysis could be conducted for the cases 
concerning the destruction of cultural heritage as a result of 
construction and operation of the Dakota access pipeline. While 
this paper only addresses one instance of destruction as a case 
study to whether the crime against humanity of persecution 
could be applied, the construction of the pipeline resulted in the 
destruction of cultural heritage, along the entire course of the 
pipeline.17 When analyzing the possibility of bringing potential 
cases of destruction of cultural heritage concerning construction 
along the entire pipeline, it seems that all four gravity factors – 
scale, nature, impact and manner of commission of the crime – 
are met. In regards to the scale and manner of commission of the 
potential crimes, these factors could be demonstrated by the 
repeated acts of destruction. When assessing the nature of the 
potential crimes in accordance with the elements of the crime 
against humanity of persecution under Article 7(1)(h) which 
requires the deprivation of “fundamental rights”, it can be 
 
 12. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 53(1)(c). 
 13. Policy Paper of Preliminary Examinations, ¶ 9, ICC (Nov. 2013), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy_Paper_Preliminary_
Examinations_2013-ENG.pdf. 
 14. Situation in Mali Article 53(1) Report, ¶ 154, ICC, (Jan. 16, 2013), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG
16Jan2013.pdf [hereinafter Mali Article 53(1) Report]. 
 15. Id. ¶ 155 (citing Y. Sandoz and others, “Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949”). 
 16. Id. ¶ 156–57. 
 17. Infra pp. 163–65. 
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demonstrated that the nature of the crimes is sufficient to meet 
the gravity threshold considering that the objects and sites 
destroyed included burial sites and ancestral graves, and stone 
rings and effigies which were unique and significant to the 
cultural and history of the tribes, as noted further below.18 In 
regards to impact, as discussed further below, the tribes affected 
by the destruction have set out the grave impact of the potential 
crimes on their cultural and history, and the protests and 
national controversy surrounding the pipeline demonstrate the 
effect these acts have had nationally and internationally.19 This 
short breakdown of each factor in the gravity assessment shows 
that a finding of sufficient gravity is possible. 
Therefore, there is a possibility that the issues of both 
jurisdiction and gravity could be overcome to allow an 
investigation and prosecution, but a final conclusion on these 
matters would depend fully on the facts of the allegations and 
the evidence provided. This would require further analysis. 
III. SITES OF CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS 
HERITAGE 
Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline was completed 
in April 2017 and first deliveries through the pipeline 
commenced on May 14, 2018.20 On June 1, 2017, it was 
announced that commercial service began through the Pipeline 
transporting crude oil from Bakken, North Dakota to Pakota, 
Illinois.21 
Since the intention to build the pipeline was announced in 
June 2014, there has been significant opposition to its 
construction due to the pipeline’s planned route along and near 
the Standing Rock Indian Reservation in North Dakota.22 A 
 
 18. ICC, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 10 (2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/
ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf [hereinafter ICC, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES]. 
 19. Infra pp. 163–68, 208, 209. 
 20. Jarrett Renshaw, East Coast Refiner Shuns Bakken Delivery as Dakota 
Access Pipeline Starts, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2017, 11:38 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-dakota-pipeline-pes-idUSKBN17L0B
J. 
 21. Timothy Cama, Dakota Access Pipeline Now in Service, HILL (June 1, 
2017, 10:02 AM EDT), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/335898-
dakota-access-pipeline-now-in-service. 
 22. Plaintiff Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1–6, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. 
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number of Native American tribes along the path of the pipeline, 
including the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe, argued that the pipeline’s construction would 
significantly destroy or irreparably damage sites of cultural 
importance to the Tribe’s cultural and religious heritage, 
including burial sites and other culturally significant sites which 
were either in the direct path of the pipeline or nearby.23 
Pipeline construction crews graded a stretch of land, which 
destroyed many cultural sites, that were identified in legal 
proceedings, such as burial grounds, rock cairns, and stone 
structures.24 Even after on-going protests, warnings on adverse 
cultural effects,25 Tribes opposing the granting of construction 
permits26, and a request for injunctive relief,27 these sites were 
still destroyed or irreparably damaged. 
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe have consistently argued that construction of the 
pipeline would harm and destroy “historically and religiously 
important” sites to both Tribes.28 To highlight the adverse 
effects, the Tribes have “participated extensively in the public 
process associated with the permits, including filing numerous 
formal technical and legal comments[s,]”29 and have provided 
legal submissions and evidence that show how culturally and 
historically significant the sites in the pipeline’s path are to the 
 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2017) 
[hereinafter Memorandum of Feb. 14, 2017]. 
 23. See Declaration of Jon Eagle, Sr. in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction ¶¶ 3, 12, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Eagle Declaration of Aug. 
4, 2016]. 
 24. Declaration of Tim Mentz, Sr. in Support of Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order ¶¶ 2–5, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Mentz Declaration 
of Sept. 4, 2016]. 
 25. See, e.g., Declaration of Dave Archambault II in Support of Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Archambault 
Declaration of Aug. 3, 2016]. 
 26. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 80, Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. July 27, 
2016) [hereinafter Complaint of July 27, 2016]. 
 27. Id. ¶ 1. 
 28. Memorandum of Feb. 14, 2017, supra note 22, at 7–9; Memorandum in 
Support of Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 3, 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) 
(D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Memorandum of Sept. 4, 2016]. 
 29. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26. 
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Tribes, as well as how these sites are in risk of damage and 
destruction. 30 The evidence set out the extent of damage caused 
by the pipeline would be along the “entire 1,100 [mile] route of 
the pipeline”.31 
It is acknowledged that concerns have been voiced about the 
effect of construction and operation of the pipeline along many 
parts of its routes from North Dakota to Illinois.32 Likewise, 
arguments made about the adverse effect of the pipeline have 
ranged from the destruction of cultural heritage to the 
environmental impact of the pipeline to water sources near the 
pipeline.33 The range of concerns on the pipeline’s effect on the 
Tribes are not limited to destruction and damage to burial 
grounds and sites of religious and cultural worship, but also the 
Tribe’s relationship with water sources, such as the Missouri 
River and Lake Oahe in North and South Dakota, which are 
“sacred to the [Standing Rock Sioux Tribe] and are central to the 
Tribe’s practice of religion.”34 However, for the purpose of this 
article, the destruction and damage of cultural heritage in one 
instance will be examined to use this instance as a case study on 
its application to international criminal law, without 
disregarding the fact that cultural heritage was affected in many 
other locations along the pipeline. 
This article will focus on the damage and destruction to sites 
of religious and cultural heritage to the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe near Canon Ball, North 
Dakota and for which legal submissions were submitted to the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.35 The evidence 
included declarations filed by several experts on tribal historical 
preservation for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe36 as well as by 
 
 30. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26, ¶¶ 76–80; Supplemental 
Declaration of Tim Mentz, Sr. in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
¶¶ 11–16, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 
(JEB) (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Mentz Declaration of Sept. 2, 2016]. 
 31. Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra note 23, ¶ 17. 
 32. Id. ¶ 40. 
 33. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26, ¶¶ 74–76. 
 34. Id. ¶¶ 77–79; Memorandum of Feb. 14, 2017, supra note 22, at 4. 
 35. See Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26. 
 36. See, e.g., Mentz Declaration of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 24; Mentz 
Declaration of Sept. 2, 2016, supra note 30; Declaration of Tim Mentz, Sr. in 
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2016) [hereinafter 
Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016]; Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra 
note 23. 
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the Chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.37 The 
submissions and evidence specifically noted that “[c]onstruction 
of the pipeline, which includes clearing and grading a 100–150 
foot access pathway nearly 1200 miles long, digging a trench as 
deep as 10 feet, and building and burying the pipeline, would 
destroy burial grounds, sacred sites, and historically significant 
areas on either side of Lake Oahe.”38 The expert declarations 
stated that these sites which are of cultural and religious 
significant to not only the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, but also the Mandan and the 
Arikara tribes, were either in the direct path of the pipeline, or 
in close enough vicinity that the effects of construction would 
irreparably damage or destroy the sites.39 It was submitted that 
construction would “without a doubt” destroy these historical 
and cultural sites.40 
Stone structures were one of the most prevalent cultural 
sites that risked damage and destruction. The cultural and 
spiritual significance of these sites were explained as sites where 
Tribal members “made commitments for the people and where 
spiritual pledges were fulfilled” and where an individual would 
find “vital spiritual connection through prayer and commitment 
at these stone features.”41 The cultural and religious significance 
of the stone features, and detriment to the Tribes when 
destroyed, has been described as follows: 
The Tribe and the members of the Standing Rock have 
direct ties to the stone features. Many have sacred 
medicine bundles that are tied to these stone feature 
sites. When these sites are adversely impacted, it 
destroys the spiritual connection to these individuals. We 
shall see the continued destruction of our spiritual places 
if the court doesn’t intervene. This destruction greatly 
harms the Tribe generally, and members of the Tribe like 
 
 37. See, e.g., Second Declaration of Dave Archambault II, Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 
2017) [hereinafter Archambault Declaration of Feb. 9, 2017]; Archambault 
Declaration of Aug. 3, 2016, supra note 25. 
 38. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26, ¶ 76; Mentz Declaration of 
Sept. 2, 2016, supra note 30, ¶¶ 1–4. 
 39. Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra note 23, ¶ 12. 
 40. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 35. 
 41. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
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myself.42 
In addition, grave sites and burial grounds were located in 
areas which would be disturbed by construction both during the 
preparatory stages of construction on the ground surface and 
once the pipeline was constructed below the ground.43 The Tribes 
made submissions about the “high concentration of gravesites”44 
along the path of the pipeline and highlighted the heightened 
cultural and religious importance of the identified grave sites 
and burial grounds which existed within the stone features45 and 
included the graves of important chiefs to the Tribes.46 
The Tribes considered that the proposed route of the 
pipeline under burial sites near Lake Oahe would result in 
“desecrat[ion]” of the graves “in much the same manner as 
placing a pipeline under a formal cemetery,”47 and emphasized 
that work preparing the ground for construction or to create 
access pathways would destroy cultural burial grounds. For 
example, legal and expert submissions warned of destruction to 
cultural sites identified near Cannon Ball, North Dakota, and 
sought injunctive relief, but grading was conducted by 
construction crews in September 2016 resulting in the damage 
and destruction of gravesites, as well as stone structures, cairns 
and stone rings. Each of these sites, including some burial 
grounds, were particularly vulnerable to damage and 
destruction as they rested on the ground’s surface. The burial 
grounds highlighted were traditionally placed near the surface 
of the ground with rock cairns placed over them.48 
The harm caused to the Tribe members affected the 
individual’s cultural and religious beliefs and traditions. After 
the destruction of the gravesites near Canon Ball, the Tribes set 
out the importance of allowing the human remains to be 
 
 42. Id. ¶ 41. 
 43. See, e.g., Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 37. 
 44. Mentz Declaration of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 24, ¶ 8; Mentz 
Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 37 (“The DAPL is going right 
through these areas we have already inventoried. Numerous burials were 
encountered along with stone buffalo effigies, huge multiple stone ring 
complexes and landscapes specific to buffalo spirit callers, a special spiritual 
man within out spiritual walks of life.”). 
 45. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 16 (explaining that 
stone structures are often the “final grave site” of an individual after the 
individual dies). 
 46. Memorandum of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 28, at 3. 
 47. Archambault Declaration of Feb. 9, 2017, supra note 37, ¶ 16. 
 48. Mentz Declaration of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 24, ¶ 8. 
168 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 28:1 
reburied in order to “help deal with the loss and hurt of 
disturbing these graves.”49 It was highlighted that the 
destruction or damage to these sites is irreparable and with “no 
‘fix’ in mitigation for these types of sites” because “[d]estruction 
of these sites will eventually destroy generations of family 
connections to these areas of spiritual power” and these sites 
“are important to the survival and recovery of [the Tribes’] 
spiritual traditions.”50 The emotional pain and long term 
significance to the Tribe’s cultural preservation was further 
highlighted with submissions with anecdotes such as:  
My grandfather and great grandfather fought in war 
with the U.S. Calvary in this valley and other enemy 
tribes to defend these stone feature sites. The destruction 
of these sites would be very personally painful to me and 
is very harmful to the cultural survival of the Tribe. Once 
lost they can never be restored.51 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTIONS FOR 
CULTURAL PROPERTY AND HERITAGE UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Since the late 1800s, international law has developed 
protections for cultural property and heritage and created 
accountability mechanisms to redress its destruction or damage. 
It has been recognized that “the preservation of cultural heritage 
is a growing international concern”52 and has become part of 
customary international law. Although protections of cultural 
property and heritage have “been reiterated repeatedly in 
successive multilateral instruments” since the late 1800s,53 
there is a clear progression in the scope of protection each 
document covers. 
Early documents recognizing the need for codified protection 
focused on the protection of cultural property and the rights of 
 
 49. Id. ¶ 9. 
 50. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 19. 
 51. Id. ¶ 37. 
 52. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-214-AnxII-Red2, Expert 
Report- Reparations Phase, Dr. Marina Lostal, ¶ 23 (Aug. 11, 2017) [hereinafter 
Al-Mahdi Reparations Order]. 
 53. Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, The Criminalisation of the International 
Destruction of Cultural Heritage, in FORGING A SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACH TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (2016). 
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the State where the property was located but failed to explicitly 
use the term “heritage” to describe the protected sites. Some of 
these documents included basic provisions on the prohibition 
against plunder or pillage of property but went on to recognize 
the protection of certain types of property which draw on the 
concept of heritage, including institutions and buildings 
dedicated to art, science, education or the religion of a society. 
For example, the 1874 Brussels Declaration is said to be one 
of the first international documents which set out a prohibition 
on destroying cultural property during times of war following the 
destruction of the cathedral and library in Strasbourg during the 
Franco-Prussian War.54 Although the document was never 
ratified,55 it demonstrates a move towards a consciousness on 
what objects should be protected during times of war.56 The 
document’s protections included the prohibition that a “town 
taken by assault ought not to be given over to pillage by the 
victorious troops,”57 but broadened the scope of its protections 
and remedies in Article 8 of the document by prohibiting the 
“seizure or destruction of, or wilful damage to, institutions 
[dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and 
sciences], historic monuments, works of art and science,” and 
making any such acts “subject of legal proceedings by the 
competent authorities.”58 
This prohibition was further memorialized in the Hague 
Convention of 1907 (the “Hague Regulations”) on the Laws and 
Customs of Wars on Land. The Regulations, which were 
“envisaged as protection of state sovereignty over the property 
that was at stake”59 required that “all necessary steps must be 
taken to spare” such cultural property as “buildings dedicated to 
religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded 
are collected.”60 Destruction of these sites was made subject to 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.; Yaron Gottlieb, Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A 
Proposal for Defining New Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the ICC, 23 PENN 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 857, 860 (2005). 
 56. Gottlieb, supra note 55, at 860. 
 57. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War art. 18, Aug. 27, 1874 (Brussels Declaration). 
 58. Id. art. 8. 
 59. BRITISH INST. OF INT’L AND COMPARATIVE LAW, THE PROTECTION OF 
CULTURAL HERITAGE IN CONFLICT 5 (2013) [hereinafter BIICL REPORT]. 
 60. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on 
Land art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 
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individual criminal responsibility in Article 56 which, in 
language similar to the Declaration of Brussels, provided that 
“seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions 
[dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and 
sciences], historic monuments, works of art and science, is 
forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal 
proceedings.”61 
Following the Hague Regulations, later documents began to 
conceptualize the protections granted as over the property itself, 
and not the State where the property was located.62 However, 
this understanding of what was the object of protection still only 
covered cultural property, and not heritage, and only during 
times of armed conflict. 
This was the case with the Preliminary Peace Conference of 
Paris in 1919 as well. As a result of cultural sites destroyed in 
World War I such as churches and libraries, the Preliminary 
Peace Conference of Paris in 1919 addressed similar protections 
during armed conflict.63 The Conference created the Commission 
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties “for the purpose of inquiring into the 
responsibilities relating to the war.”64 The Commission’s report 
presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference addressed issues 
of individual criminal responsibility by including a list of war 
crimes which included the crime of “wanton destruction of 
religious, charitable, educational, and historic buildings and 
monuments.”65 
Perhaps the pinnacle of individual criminal responsibility to 
this point, for acts of damage and destruction to cultural 
property, came with the Nuremberg Charter and Tribunal. 
Following World War II, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
further demonstrated the acceptance of adopting international 
crimes for the destruction of cultural property during armed 
conflict. Article 6(b) of the Charter reverted to the basic and 
limited terminology of “plunder of public or private property” or 
“wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages” when setting out 
 
[hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]. 
 61. Id. art. 56. 
 62. BIICL REPORT, supra note 59 (indicating that protection was over “the 
cultural property as the object of protection”). 
 63. See M. Adatci, Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the 
War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 95 (1920). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 115. 
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applicable war crimes for which the perpetrator can be held 
individually responsible.66 However, in practice, Article 6(b) was 
applied before the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg in count three of the indictment, which listed war 
crimes under Article 6, section E on “plunder of public and 
private property”67 with the crime of plunder including the 
destruction of property such as “cultural monuments” and 
“scientific institutions.”68 The International Military Tribunal’s 
Judgment also highlighted that the Tribunal considered a wide 
range of properties which speak to the heritage of the cultural 
property harmed. For example, among the accused, Alfred 
Rosenberg was found individually responsible under this 
provision for acts including the plunder of “museums and 
libraries, confiscated art treasures and collections.”69 
The Additional Protocols of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
provided further protection during armed conflicts of both an 
international and non-international character with both 
Protocol I and II prohibiting “acts of hostility directed against 
the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which 
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples.”70 State 
acceptance of the Protocols is overwhelming with 174 States 
ratifying Protocol I, and 169 States ratifying Protocol II.71 
It wasn’t until 1954 that the object of protection in 
 
 66. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis and Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
 67. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 55 
(1947). 
 68. Id. at 55–56. 
 69. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 540 
(1948) [hereinafter NUREMBERG JUDGMENT]; see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, 
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 228 (Mar. 3, 2000). 
 70. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 
16, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts art. 53(a), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 71. See Treaties, State Parties, and Commentaries, ICRC, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORM
StatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470 (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (listing state 
parties to Protocol I); Treaties, State Parties, and Commentaries, ICRC, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPag
es_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=475 (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) 
(listing state parties to Protocol II). 
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international instruments was extended to explicitly cover 
cultural heritage in addition to cultural property, but also to 
recognize the human link to these physical properties and 
sites.72 To this, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict and its First 
Protocol of 1954 and Second Protocol of 1999 are important to 
the growing protection under international law for several 
reasons. First, the Convention expanded the scope of protection 
by using the term “heritage” as opposed to the texts of the past 
which focused on the materialistic protection of only cultural 
“property.”73 Next, the Second Protocol of 1999 established 
individual criminal responsibility for violations of these 
prohibitions.74 Last, the Convention and its Protocols specifically 
recognized that sites guarded by the Convention are done so in 
order to protect interests and rights of the people who value 
these sites.75 Article 1(a) of the Convention makes both points 
clear by defining cultural property as “movable or immovable 
property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every 
people,”76 and the Protocols of 1954 and 1999 reference, and thus 
support, this definition.77 Importantly, the Preamble of the 
Convention further highlights both these points by stating that: 
Being convinced that damage to cultural property 
belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the 
cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people 
makes its contribution to the culture of the world; 
Considering that the preservation of the cultural 
 
 72. Corine Wegener, The 1954 Hague Convention and Preserving Cultural 
Heritage, 1, ARCHAEOLOGICAL INST. AM. (Oct. 19, 2010), https://www.archaeo
logical.org/sites/default/files/files/Wegener%20v2.pdf. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 15–21. Mar. 26, 1999, 
2253 U.N.T.S. 212, 218–20 [hereinafter Second Protocol]; see also ZUOZHEN LIU, 
THE CASE FOR REPATRIATING CHINA’S CULTURAL OBJECTS 34 (2016). 
 75. Francesco Francioni, The Human Dimension of International Cultural 
Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 13 (2011) (“It is interesting 
to note that this statement speaks of ‘people’ and not states”). 
 76. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict art. 1(a), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 242 [hereinafter 1954 
Hague Convention]. 
 77. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter 
First Protocol]; Second Protocol, supra note 74, art. 1(b). 
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heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the world 
and that it is important that this heritage should receive 
international protection.78 
With adoption of the Hague Convention of 1954, there was 
a clear recognition that the prohibition against the destruction 
or damage of cultural property and heritage had gained the 
status of customary international law.79 Widespread 
international practice and acceptance of the protection of 
cultural property led to this recognition, evidenced by the 
extensive acceptance of the Additional Protocols of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and the Nuremberg Tribunal’s recognition 
that the protections set out in the 1907 Hague Regulations “were 
recognized by all civilized nations” and based on the general laws 
and customs of war at the time.80 
Commentary on the influence of the Hague Convention of 
1954 recognizes it as the “paramount international 
instrument”81 and notes that “consistent and unambiguous 
practice”82 has resulted from “the basic principles . . . [which] 
have become part of customary international law.”83 
By the time of the adoption of the World Heritage 
Convention in 1972, international protection focused on “the 
protection of cultural heritage as a matter of public interest, and 
not only as part of private property rights.”84 Its adoption by 193 
State parties “reflected and channelled the pre-existing 
international will” to protect cultural heritage85 and gave it a 
 
 78. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 76, pmbl. 
 79. See, e.g., 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 129, 131 (2005); LIU, 
supra note 74, at 34; Francioni, supra note 75, at 11. 
 80. NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 69, at 253–54; Vrdoljak, supra note 
53, at 3. 
 81. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, New Rules for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in Armed Conflict, 81 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 593, 593–94 (1999). 
 82. Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the 
Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 635 
(2003).. 
 83. Henckaerts, supra note 81, at 593–94; see also Prosecutor v. Al-Mahdi, 
ICC-01/12-01/15-214-Anx1-Red3, Brief by Ms. Karima Bennoune, 4 (Aug. 14, 
2017) [hereinafter Al-Mahdi Report of Bennoune]. 
 84. Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 82, at 635. 
 85. Prosecutor v. Al-Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-214-AnxII-Red2, Expert 
Report—Reparations Phase, ¶ 33 (Aug. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Al-Mahdi Report 
of Lostal]; see also Al-Mahdi Reparations Order, supra note 52, at ¶ 20 (adopting 
Al-Mahdi Report of Lostal). 
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“near-universal character.”86 The Convention recognized “that 
parts of the cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding 
interest” and that its protection was important to “the world 
heritage of mankind as a whole.”87 The Convention called for 
States to inventory sites of particular cultural heritage and 
significance for protection through international cooperation, 
but importantly stated that heritage sites not included within a 
State’s inventory “shall in no way be construed to mean that it 
does not have an outstanding universal value.”88 The Convention 
also created a monitoring body, the World Heritage Committee, 
designed to monitor application of the Convention and specific 
sites at risk.89 
What is particularly interesting about the World Heritage 
Convention’s adoption was that it was motivated by events 
which threatened cultural heritage outside of an armed conflict. 
Until this time, no document had contemplated or addressed the 
protection of cultural heritage (not just property) outside of an 
armed conflict during times of peace. The Convention was in 
response to the risk of damaging or destroying “ancient Nubian 
monuments in the rock temples of Abu Simbel in Egypt” as a 
result of the “construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile 
in 1954” which would flood the cultural sites.90 Although the text 
of the World Heritage Convention only speaks to protections 
during an armed conflict and does not address protections in 
times of peace, the document was inspired by a threat to cultural 
heritage outside of an armed conflict (a construction project) and 
recognizes that “the cultural heritage and the natural heritage 
are increasingly threatened with destruction . . . by changing 
social and economic conditions.”91 The major international 
instruments on cultural property and heritage protection had 
focused on protections during armed conflicts, but the events 
which inspired the Convention’s adoption, in effect are a nod to 
the direction in which protection is developing. 
In 2003, UNESCO adopted the Declaration Concerning the 
International Destruction of Cultural Heritage, which is held as 
 
 86. Francioni, supra note 75, at 11. 
 87. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage, pmbl, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World 
Heritage Convention]. 
 88. Id. art. 12. 
 89. Id. art. 8–13. 
 90. Al-Mahdi Report of Lostal, supra note 85, ¶ 33. 
 91. World Heritage Convention, supra note 87, pmbl. 
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“evidence of customary international law.”92 Importantly, the 
UNESCO Declaration recognized the gap between protection of 
cultural heritage and property during armed conflict versus 
times of peace, and that the development of customary 
international law is developing towards closing this gap.93 The 
Declaration notes the “development of rules of customary 
international law . . . related to the protection of cultural 
heritage in peacetime as well as in the event of armed conflict” 
and creates a duty for States to “take all appropriate measures 
to conduct them in such a manner as to protect cultural heritage” 
during peacetime activities.94 
The development of international protections through these 
instruments and documents clearly supports a conclusion that 
the protection of both cultural property and heritage during 
armed conflict is part of customary international law. In 
practice, this is demonstrated through the reliance of the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly on these norms. For 
example, on July 5, 2012, the UN Security Council condemned 
the “desecration, damage and destruction of sites of holy, historic 
and cultural significance” in Mali in Resolution 2056,95 and on 
February 22, 2014, called on States to protect Syria’s “rich 
societal mosaic and cultural heritage” and World Heritage Sites 
in Resolution 2139.96 In Resolution 2199, the Security Council 
condemned “the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and 
Syria.”97 Similarly, UN General Assembly 69/281 stressed the 
importance of cultural heritage in response to destruction of 
cultural heritage in Iraq carried out by the Islamic State by 
noting that “the destruction of cultural heritage, which is 
representative of the diversity of human culture, erases the 
collective memories of a nation, destabilizes communities and 
threatens their cultural identity,” and affirmed that attacks 
“amount to war crimes.”98 However, like the Resolutions from 
the UN Security Council, the General Assembly only addressed 
 
 92. Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime 
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[hereinafter 2003 UNESCO Declaration]. 
 94. Id. pt. IV. 
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the destruction in the context of an armed conflict and only 
noting war crimes as a criminal remedy; leaving protection of 
cultural heritage during peace time unaddressed. 
Most notably, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
2347 on March 24, 2017, which addressed the importance of the 
protection of cultural property.99 In regards to accountability, 
the Resolution affirmed “that directing unlawful attacks against 
sites and buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science 
or charitable purposes, or historic monuments may constitute, 
under certain circumstances and pursuant to international law 
a war crime and that perpetrators of such attacks must be 
brought to justice,” and while recognizing the ICC’s decision 
convicting Al-Mahdi of war crimes for attacks in Mali.100 Again, 
the Resolution failed to recognize the importance of protecting 
cultural heritage during times of peace, and only emphasized the 
“unlawful destruction of cultural heritage, and the looting and 
smuggling of cultural property in the event of armed 
conflicts . . . .”101 
Unlike the international norms protecting cultural property 
and heritage during armed conflict, “the protection of cultural 
[heritage and] property during peacetime is more ambiguous.”102 
Thus, peace-time protection of cultural heritage and property 
can be more accurately said to be in the process of ‘developing’ 
towards the status of customary international law, as evidenced 
by the 2003 UNESCO Declaration.103 Scholarly writing has 
noted that it would be “far fetched to conclude that no legal 
protection is given to cultural property in peacetime[,]” but found 
that it is hard to conclude that an international norm rising to 
the level of customary international law has been established.104 
Nevertheless, the adoption of several instruments recognizing 
the importance of protecting sites of cultural heritage during 
times of peace is a step toward making this principle an 
international norm. 
In addition to the 2003 UNESCO Declaration, several 
international documents mentioned protections during both 
times of war and peace, but as they pre-dated the trend toward 
protecting both property and heritage, only focused on property 
 
 99. S.C. Res. 2347 (Mar. 24, 2017). 
 100. Id. ¶ 3–4. 
 101. Id. ¶ 1. 
 102. Gottlieb, supra note 55, at 872. 
 103. See 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 93, pt. IV. 
 104. Gottlieb, supra note 55, at 872. 
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as the object of protection. These documents included the 
American Roerich Pact of 1935—signed by 11 States in South 
and Central America—which provided that the “same respect 
and protection shall be accorded to the historic monuments, 
museums, scientific, artistic, educational and cultural 
institutions in time of peace as well as in war.”105 Likewise, 
protection of cultural property against illicit import, export and 
transfer of ownership, without mention of whether the 
protection covered the property during times of peace or war, 
was laid out in the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting 
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property.106 
The protection of both cultural heritage and property during 
times of peace had formerly been recognized by UNESCO in its 
Recommendation Concerning the Preservation of Cultural 
Property Endangered by Public or Private Works of 1968.107 In 
recognizing the importance of cultural heritage to mankind, the 
Recommendation emphasized that protection “extend[ing] to the 
whole territory of the State” and not just to “certain monuments 
and sites”108 and must be aimed at activities which take place 
during times of peace, including the “construction of pipelines 
and of power and transmission lines of electricity[.]”109 
More recently, the Convention for the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage was adopted by the UNESCO 
General Conference in 2003 and entered into force in 2006.110 
Not only did the Convention recognize that “no binding 
multilateral instrument as yet exists for the safeguarding of the 
intangible cultural heritage,”111 but it also provided protection 
during peacetime for the “practices, representations, 
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 106. See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 
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expressions, knowledge, skills—as well as the instruments, 
objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith” 
which it considered to be intangible cultural heritage.112 In 
addition, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, also 
provides protection for cultural heritage during times of 
peace.113 Article 31 of the Declaration sets out the right of 
indigenous peoples “to maintain, control, protect and develop 
their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions” and “to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, 
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.”114 
It has also been argued that the Declaration’s “raison d’etre is 
the preservation and development of the cultural identity of 
indigenous peoples . . . .”115 
Therefore, while it is difficult to conclude that an 
international norm rising to the level of customary international 
law has been established which protects international property 
and heritage during times of peace, the existence of a number of 
international instruments addressing protection during 
peacetime demonstrates a clear development in that direction. 
This development could lead to a norm under customary 
international law recognizing that cultural heritage and 
property are threatened not only during an armed conflict, but 
that the everyday economic and social activities of a society 
during peacetime could also put these sites at risk. 
It must be noted that the recognition of such a norm is 
unnecessary to support criminal action when an act specifically 
violates an existing instrument which sets out individual 
criminal responsibility for violations of its protections, such as 
the Second Protocol of 1999 to the Hague Convention.116 Instead, 
establishing a customary international law norm over the 
protection of cultural heritage during peacetime would assist 
with reaching the conclusion that an attack on cultural heritage 
during peacetime constitutes a deprivation of a group’s 
fundamental human rights contrary to international law, and 
thus, an act grave enough to rise to the level of a crime of 
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persecution, as discussed in more detail below.117 
V. DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AS A 
WAR CRIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW, AND THE ICC’S AL-MAHDI 
PROSECUTION 
Although international instruments on the protection of 
cultural property and heritage can be said to be developing 
toward a consensus of protections during peacetime as well as 
during armed conflict, the legal texts and case law of 
international criminal tribunals have solely applied to instances 
of destruction of cultural property and heritage during armed 
conflicts.  
The legal texts of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia (ECCC) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stand out as allowing for 
prosecutions when cultural heritage is destroyed; although, only 
as a war crime when committed during an armed conflict. The 
ECCC adopted the destruction of cultural property as a crime 
under its jurisdiction.118 Based on a reading of the 1954 Hague 
Convention, which found that “damage to cultural property 
belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the 
cultural heritage of all mankind”, the ECCC’s Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers grants, in Article 
7, “the power to bring to trial all Suspects most responsible for 
the destruction of cultural property during armed 
conflict . . . .”119 The ICTY codified the protection of cultural 
property under international humanitarian law as a crime 
under Article 3 of its statute.120 Article 3 sets out violations of 
the laws and customs of war with section (d) giving the Tribunal 
the power to prosecute individuals violating the prohibition 
against “seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to 
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts 
and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and 
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science . . . .”121 
This is in comparison to the statutes establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) which give each body the 
power to prosecute persons for attacks against cultural property, 
but in the limited scope of only recognizing acts of pillage 
committed during an armed conflict as violations.122 The 
Statutes of the ICTR and SCSL allow for the acts of pillage in 
violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II to be investigated and prosecuted as war 
crimes.123 
While this article concludes that the destruction of cultural 
heritage and property occurring during peacetime may be 
addressed by the ICC as a crime against humanity, the ICC’s 
Statute is similar to the legal texts of the ICTY, ECCC, ICTR 
and SCSL which only allow prosecutions for attacks on cultural 
property (i.e. providing protection for cultural heritage) during 
times of war.124 With language mirroring the protections granted 
to cultural property under Article 27 of the Hague Convention of 
1907,125 Article 8(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute provides that 
“serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed 
conflicts not of an international charter” include “[i]ntentionally 
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, 
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded 
are collected.”126 
In addition, the case law of the ICC has only recently 
addressed the protection of cultural heritage. The case against 
Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute marked the first time the ICC had brought charges for 
the destruction of cultural heritage under any provision of the 
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Rome Statute, and in this case only as a war crime. While 
initiation of this case indicates a recognition by the ICC of the 
importance of crimes committed against cultural heritage, it 
gives no indication that it will consider the destruction of 
cultural heritage as a crime against humanity of persecution 
under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 
In the case against Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi, the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber issued an arrest warrant on September 18, 2015, 
accusing Al Mahdi of being individually criminally responsible 
for the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against 
historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion, 
including nine mausoleums and one mosque in Timbuktu during 
an armed conflict not of an international character.127 The trial 
was quickly resolved when Al-Mahdi made an admission of guilt 
on August 22, 2016,128 and as a result the Trial Chamber issued 
a judgment on September 27, 2016 deciding that “the Chamber 
is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that all the essential facts 
of the crime charged are proven” and as a result “convicts Mr. Al 
Mahdi as a co-perpetrator for attacking . . . protected objects in 
Timbuktu, Mali” pursuant to Articles 8(2)(e)(iv), 25(3)(a) and 
65(2) of the Rome Statute.129 
During the preliminary examination phase of the Situation 
in Mali, reports from the Office of the Prosecutor in 2012 and 
2013 indicated that the Prosecution was examining and 
investigating the alleged acts as war crimes, while noting that 
“the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to 
believe that crimes against humanity under Article 7 have been 
committed in the Situation in Mali.”130 The Prosecution’s report 
at the initiation of its formal investigation stated that its 
assessment on applicable crimes against humanity “may be 
revisited in the future,”131 but the Court proceeded with issuing 
an arrest warrant on the basis of war crimes only.132 The 
decision of the Prosecution not to investigate or prosecute the 
attacks against cultural heritage—bearing some similarities to 
 
 127. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15-1-Red, Mandat 
d’arrêt à l’encontre d’Ahmad AL FAQI AL MAHDI (Sept. 18, 2015) [hereinafter 
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 128. Al-Mahdi Judgment, supra note 7, ¶¶ 7, 98–100. 
 129. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. 
 130. Mali Article 53(1) Report, supra note 14, ¶¶ 8, 128; ICC, Office of the 
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2012). 
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the sites of cultural heritage damaged and destroyed during 
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline—as a crime against 
humanity in the case of Mali, should not speak to the prospect of 
the ICC applying Article 7 to other incidents where cultural 
heritage is attacked during times of peace. 
The Trial Chamber’s strong findings in its recent Judgment 
and Reparations decisions on the importance of cultural heritage 
and “special protection of cultural property in international 
law”133 indicate the ICC’s willingness to view the protection of 
cultural heritage with a broad scope. The Trial Chamber’s recent 
Reparations Order of October 17, 2017, drew significant 
parallels to the ways that destroying a community’s cultural 
heritage deprives the population of its fundamental rights. For 
example, the Trial Chamber observed the “importance of the 
human right to cultural life and its physical embodiments” and 
that destruction of cultural heritage would violate this right by 
“depriv[ing] a community of its identity and memory, as well as 
the physical testimony of its past.”134 The Trial Chamber 
recognized that criminalizing its damage and destruction is not 
just about protecting property, but also about the individuals 
and communities affected; stating that “[c]ultural heritage is 
important not only in itself, but also in relation to its human 
dimension.”135 
Recognition of the human element when cultural heritage is 
attacked is critical to finding that crimes against humanity, 
under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, are applicable to the events 
concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline, and any other events 
involving the destruction of cultural heritage in times of 
peace.136 This is because a crime against humanity is ultimately 
a crime about harm committed against humans, as noted in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which plainly requires that a 
crime against humanity must be “directed against [a] civilian 
population.”137 For the underlying crime of persecution, the 
deprivation of a fundamental right must have been committed 
in a “collective nature” against a population or group of the 
 
 133. Al-Mahdi Judgment, supra note 7, ¶¶ 13–14. 
 134. Al-Mahdi Reparations Order, supra note 52, ¶ 14. 
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people.138 
The case law of the ICTY demonstrates that the destruction 
of cultural property can be viewed as a crime against humans 
which violates their fundamental human rights and creates a 
precedent for the ICC to similarly apply Article 7 to allegations 
of attacks on cultural heritage. 
 
VI. DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AS A 
CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY BEFORE THE 
ICTY 
The destruction of cultural heritage has been recognised as 
a punishable offence not only as a war crime but also as a crime 
against humanity of persecution under international criminal 
law.139 Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, a series of cases has supported the 
conclusion that the destruction of cultural property is an act of 
persecution and has issued convictions on the crime against 
humanity of persecution based on attacks against property and 
sites which held cultural importance. 
In finding that acts of destruction of cultural heritage 
amount to the crime against humanity of persecution, several 
cases explicitly noted the human link between the act of 
destroying or damaging cultural heritage and the fundamental 
right of the individuals affected which elevates the acts to the 
crime of persecution as a crime against humanity. In the Blaskic 
case, the ICTY Trial Chamber identified the human element 
associated with the destruction of cultural heritage, which is 
required to constitute the denial of a fundamental right rising to 
the level of persecution as a crime against humanity. The Trial 
Chamber stated that “persecution may take forms other than 
injury to the human person, in particular those acts rendered 
serious not by their apparent cruelty but by the discrimination 
they seek to instil [sic] within humankind.”140 The Chamber 
expanded the scope of what harm demonstrates persecution, 
stating that the crime of persecution “encompasses not only 
bodily and mental harm and infringements upon individual 
 
 138. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 
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 139. See Gerstenblith, supra note 92, at 390. 
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freedom but also acts which appear less serious, such as those 
targeting property, so long as the victimised persons were 
specially selected on grounds linked to their belonging to a 
particular community.”141 
Similarly, in the Krajisnik case, the Trial Chamber 
recognised that attacks on cultural property affect the rights of 
a person and have “a severe impact on persons who value that 
property.”142 On this basis the Trial Chamber confirmed that the 
destruction of cultural property is “an underlying act of 
persecution” and includes the “destruction or damage of an 
institution dedicated to religion, charity, education, or the arts 
and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science, 
when the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy or damage 
that property or in the reckless disregard of the substantial 
likelihood of the destruction or damage.”143 
In Kordić and Čerkez, the Trial Chamber recognised that 
attacks on cultural heritage of a religious nature “may amount 
to an act of persecution” because it is an attack “on the very 
religious identity of a people.”144 In addition, it found a wider 
effect than the immediate individuals harmed, as “all of 
humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a unique 
religious culture and its concomitant cultural objects;”145 a 
conclusion which supported its finding that the act of 
persecution was a crime against humanity. This conclusion was 
reinforced in Jokic, which found that the destruction of historical 
locations, such as the Old Town of Dubrovnik, “was an attack 
not only against the history and heritage of the region, but also 
against the cultural heritage of humankind.”146 In addition to 
the above, the cases against Naletilic and Martinovic,147 Prlić,148 
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Brdanin149 and Milutinović150 found that the crime against 
humanity of persecution was committed by the “destruction or 
wilful damage done to institutions” of cultural significance to 
individuals and communities including those “dedicated to 
religion.”151 
Although the factual background of each of these cases 
before the ICTY involved crimes committed during the course of 
an armed conflict, a clear precedent was set that the destruction 
of cultural heritage can be applied under international criminal 
law as a crime against humanity; opening the door for this crime 
against humanity to be applied to crimes committed during 
times of peace. 
The ICTY’s case law is important to advancing the 
application of Article 7 of the Rome Statute to instances of 
cultural heritage destruction. However, each ICTY case 
charging a crime against humanity of persecution for the 
destruction of cultural heritage concerns allegations of 
destruction or damage which took place during an armed 
conflict. This reality can be attributed to the jurisdictional limit 
the Statute of the ICTY placed over crimes against humanity. 
Article 5 of the Statute concerns “crimes when committed in 
armed conflict, whether international or internal in 
character.”152 The ICTY’s inclusion of a ‘war nexus’ as a 
jurisdictional limit over the definition of crimes against 
humanity originates in the formulation of crimes against 
humanity in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
(the Nuremberg Tribunal) in order to rationalize international 
jurisdiction over these crimes and not with the intention of 
limiting the definition or scope of the crimes.153 
 
 149. See Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 15(c), 
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Following the Nuremberg Tribunal, the ‘war nexus’ was 
applied to crimes against humanity as a substantive element by 
“international tribunals, international law drafters and 
commentators in the post-Nuremberg era [which] were left to 
follow the Nuremberg precedent in their treatment of the 
prohibition against crimes against humanity.”154 As noted above, 
this included the Statute of the ICTY, but it is notable that the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY made clear that the ‘war nexus’ 
was merely a jurisdictional limit and not a substantive element 
of the crime.155 
Although there is no precedent to date under international 
criminal law where the crime against humanity of persecution 
has been applied to events occurring during times of peace, the 
provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC on crimes against 
humanity contain no jurisdictional limits which require a ‘war 
nexus.’156 
Therefore, this article will examine the requirements under 
Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute for establishing a crime 
against humanity of persecution with regard to the events 
concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline, as well as the 
destruction of cultural heritage more generally during times of 
peace. 
VII. THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME AGAINST 
HUMANITY OF PERSECUTION, AND THE 
DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE 
As demonstrated in the case law of the ICTY, the 
destruction of cultural heritage has been recognised not only as 
a war crime but also as a crime against humanity of 
persecution.157 However, the jurisdictional limits of the Tribunal 
 
during the war’ and ‘in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal,’ i.e., war crimes or crimes against the peace. This 
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 156. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7; Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes 
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and the “war nexus” requirement for crimes against humanity 
mean that the crime of persecution as a crime against humanity 
cannot be applied to events occurring during times of peace. 
Therefore, to analyze the applicability of this crime during times 
of peace, the provisions of the Rome Statute on crimes against 
humanity, which were drafted to eliminate jurisdictional limits 
involving the war nexus requirement, must be examined. 
The Rome Statute sets out in Article 7 that a crime against 
humanity means any of the underlying acts listed in Article 7(1) 
“when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack.”158 Among the underlying acts listed in Article 7, is the 
act of persecution under Article 7(1)(h). In order to allege that 
the destruction of cultural property and heritage is a crime 
against humanity of persecution, the Rome Statute requires that 
the contextual elements of a crime against humanity are proven 
as well as the elements of the underlying act of persecution. In 
addition, the case law of the ICTY requires an examination of 
the actus reus and mens rea of the underlying act of destruction 
of cultural heritage.159 
For this analysis, the requirements for the underlying crime 
of persecution, along with the actus reus and mens rea for its 
underlying act of destruction of cultural heritage, will be 
examined considering the events surrounding the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, ending with a review of the contextual elements 
necessary for proving a crime against humanity. In 
acknowledging that there are allegations of destruction and 
damage of cultural heritage in many other locations along the 
pipeline affecting many Native American Tribes, this article will 
focus on the allegations made by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
as well as the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe concerning the sites 
and objects of cultural and religious heritage which were 
damaged and destroyed near Cannon Ball, North Dakota. 
A. THE UNDERLYING CRIME OF PERSECUTION 
Article 7(1)(h) establishes the act of “persecution against 
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . or other grounds that are 
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universally recognized as impermissible under international 
law” as an underlying crime to an Article 7 crime against 
humanity, and specifies that it must be committed “in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”160 Article 7(2)(g) goes 
on to define persecution as “the intentional and severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law 
by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”161 
The ICC’s document “Elements of Crimes” sets out the 
required elements for the “crime against humanity of 
persecution”.162 As the fifth and sixth element listed in the 
document relate to the contextual elements for crimes against 
humanity, it is the first four elements listed in the Elements of 
Crimes which set out the elements for the crime of 
persecution.163 The Elements of Crimes requires the following 
four elements for an act to constitute a crime against humanity 
of persecution under article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute: 
1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to 
international law, one or more persons of fundamental 
rights. 
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by 
reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted 
the group or collectivity as such. 
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in article 7, 
paragraph 3, of the Statute, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law. 
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act 
referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.164 
 
 160. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(h). 
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1. The underlying conduct of destroying or damaging 
cultural heritage and property 
It is notable that the Rome Statute nowhere mentions that 
the crime of persecution includes the act of destroying cultural 
heritage or property.165 By contrast, the case law of the ICTY 
found that the act of destruction itself must first be established; 
that in order to address acts of destruction of cultural heritage 
as a crime against humanity of persecution, “the actus reus and 
mens rea” must be established for the underlying act of “wanton 
destruction or damage of religious sites and cultural 
monuments, as a form of persecution, a crime against 
humanity.”166 
The ICTY Trial Chamber in the Milutinović case set out the 
requirements for establishing the actus reus for the underlying 
offence of destruction of cultural property and heritage as 
follows: “(a) the religious or cultural property must be destroyed 
or damaged extensively; (b) the religious or cultural property 
must not be used for a military purpose at the time of the act; 
and (c) the destruction or damage must be the result of an act 
directed against this property.”167 
In setting out these actus reus elements, the Trial Chamber 
in Milutinović further defined the terms “destruction” and 
“damage.” While both “destruction” and “damage” “must be 
extensive,” the term destruction “signifie[s] demolition or 
reduction to a useless form,” and the term damage “refers to 
physical injury or harm to an object that impairs its usefulness 
or value.”168 
These definitions assist with analysing the first element in 
Milutinović for the underlying offence of destruction of cultural 
property and heritage. The Milutinović court noted how these 
sites were extensively destroyed and damaged, such that they 
were rendered useless, and that they had lost their cultural 
value169 due to the grading conducted by construction crews in 
order to make an access road to the pipeline.170 Expert testimony 
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set out the extent of the damages which construction companies 
caused to these sites due to the fact that most were located at or 
near the surface of the ground, and would therefore be critically 
affected by grading of the ground’s surface. The culturally-
significant stone structures and cairns identified and then 
damaged and destroyed, were located on the ground’s surface, 
and were therefore destroyed by the construction work on 
September 3, 2016.171 The location also had a high concentration 
of grave sites to the Tribes’ ancestors and of important chiefs, 
many of which were located at or near the surface, with cairns 
placed on top of the graves. The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
highlighted the extent of construction crews’ damage to these 
culturally-significant burial sites by petitioning to halt all 
construction in the days following the grading process, so that 
they could collect and rebury the human remains which the 
crews had displaced and scattered.172 Testimony from Tribe 
members and cultural experts noted that the damage was 
extensive enough to be described as “irreparable.”173 
As to the second element on whether the property had the 
status of a civilian versus a military object, the ICTY’s 
jurisdictional limitation requiring a ‘war nexus’ for crimes 
against humanity comes to mind,174 as well as the importance 
under international humanitarian law principles of ascertaining 
the legality of an attack based on a target’s status as a military 
object.175 Given that the nexus to an armed conflict is not 
required before the ICC, and analysis at issue under Article 7 is 
for an event taking place in times of peace, it is unclear how the 
ICC would consider this element under Milutinović. 
Nevertheless, it is clear in the case of destruction of cultural 
heritage near Cannon Ball, North Dakota that the cultural and 
religious objects destroyed were not military objects, nor were 
they used for any military purpose. 
Last, the cultural heritage and property located in the area 
near Canon Ball, North Dakota and along the path of the 
pipeline were the ancestral “gravesites and culturally important 
stone features,” such as stone structures, effigies and cairns “in 
and adjacent to the right of way” of the pipeline, all of which 
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were destroyed on September 3, 2016.176 Given the notification 
of the presence of objects of cultural heritage before the area was 
graded for construction,177 it can be argued those responsible for 
construction on the land had notice that grading the land would 
destroy these objects. With this knowledge, it can be said that 
the actions of construction were an “act directed against” the 
cultural property and heritage of the Tribes. 
Therefore, I argue that the act of destroying or damaging 
cultural heritage or property, as underlying conduct to the crime 
against humanity of persecution, in the case of the cultural 
heritage and property near Cannon Ball, is present. The 
construction companies took actions directed against the land, 
which they knew would damage objects of cultural heritage that 
were not military objects. Further, the crews did in fact destroy 
or damage these sites and objects to an irreparable state which 
impaired their cultural and religious value. 
2. The intent to destroy or damage cultural heritage and 
property 
As for the required mens rea at the ICC for the act of 
destroying cultural heritage and property, Article 30 of the Rome 
Statute sets out that “a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court only if the material elements are committed with 
intent and knowledge.”178 Article 30 defines ‘intent’ as 
“mean[ing] to engage in the conduct” and being aware that the 
consequence “will occur in the ordinary course of events.”179 
While ‘knowledge’ is defined as “awareness that a circumstance 
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.”180 
It is notable that for the ICC’s first case considering the war 
crime of destruction of cultural heritage under Article 8(2)(e)(iv), 
the Trial Chamber found that the “specific intent of the 
defendant to attack protected objects” was the required mens rea 
for Article 8(2)(e)(iv).181 For the purpose of holding attacks on 
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cultural heritage as a crime against humanity of persecution 
under Article 7(1)(h), the requirements of Article 30, and the 
mens rea requirement for destruction of property in Al-Mahdi 
are informative. For the crime against humanity of persecution, 
a “high threshold of intention” is required to show “intentional 
and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law.”182 
Further, the case law of the ICTY provides guidance on the 
required actus reus for destruction or damage to cultural 
heritage or property as a crime against humanity.183 
Jurisprudence from the Milutinović and Krajisnik cases apply a 
standard which broadly holds individuals responsible not only if 
their actions are committed with the specific intent to deprive a 
group or collectivity of fundamental rights, but also if the 
perpetrator’s actions are committed with knowledge that the 
actions would cause harm and were taken, nevertheless, with 
reckless disregard.184 The Trial Chambers in the Milutinović and 
Krajisnik cases explained that the “mens rea required for the 
offence is that the physical perpetrator, intermediary 
perpetrator, or accused acted with the intent to destroy or 
extensively damage the property in question, or in reckless 
disregard of the likelihood of its destruction or damage.”185 
Commentary on the ‘intentionality element’ of the 
destruction of cultural heritage has noted that, under the Rome 
Statute, this element “needs to be understood in light of a 
standard of reckless disregard or willful negligence for the 
consequences of an attack that is likely to cause collateral 
damage to cultural heritage.”186 Likewise, the UNESCO 
Declaration of 2003 also supports the proposition that the intent 
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requirement should consider both specific intent and reckless 
disregard on the part of the perpetrator.187 Although the 
UNESCO Declaration addresses the standard of intent for 
States which are responsible for acts of destruction, and not the 
standard on the level of individual criminal responsibility, it 
provides that a State which “intentionally destroys or 
intentionally fails to take appropriate measures to prohibit, 
prevent, stop, and punish any intentional destruction of cultural 
heritage of great importance for humanity . . . bears the 
responsibility for such destruction.”188 This is further supported 
by UN Security Council Resolution 2199, which addresses both 
the “incidental or deliberate” destruction of cultural property.189 
In the case of the pipeline, those responsible for construction 
of the pipeline had been notified of the presence of the cultural 
heritage on the areas meant for construction, and of the 
likelihood that construction would irreparably damage and 
destroy these sites, through legal submissions and expert 
declarations which documented that ancestral graves, stone 
rings, cairns, effigies and other culturally significant sites were 
either in the direct path of the pipeline, or in close vicinity.190 
The submissions and evidence specifically noted that 
“[c]onstruction of the pipeline, which includes clearing and 
grading a 100–150 foot access pathway nearly 1200 miles long, 
digging a trench as deep as 10 feet, and building and burying the 
pipeline, would destroy burial grounds, sacred sites, and 
historically significant areas on either side of Lake Oahe.”191 The 
cultural and religious significance of these sites to the Tribes 
was also made clear.192 It was submitted that construction would 
“without a doubt” destroy these historical and cultural sites.193 
Despite the legal and expert submissions submitted and 
efforts for injunctive relief warning of the sites’ vulnerability to 
damage and destruction due to their location at or near the 
ground’s surface, construction crews commenced grading 
operations in September 2016, resulting in the damage and 
destruction of gravesites, as well as stone structures, cairns and 
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stone rings. The fact that the corporations involved with 
construction proceeded despite notification through legal 
proceedings of the presence of cultural heritage on the locations 
of potential construction, demonstrates an intent to take action 
with knowledge of the likelihood that the actions would result in 
the destruction and damage of these sites. It could be asserted 
that those responsible for the construction of the pipeline 
specifically intended to destroy the cultural heritage by moving 
forward with construction on the site, but a more likely 
argument is that these actions were taken with full knowledge, 
and reckless disregard, of the consequences of the actions. 
Therefore, I argue that the required mens rea, which would be 
applied to the crime against humanity of persecution for 
destroying cultural heritage, has been met. 
3. The group or collectivity was targeted based on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or 
other grounds. 
Carrying on from the analysis of intent, the Elements of 
Crimes requires that an act of persecution demonstrate that the 
group or collectivity whose cultural heritage was destroyed was 
targeted on the basis of political, racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, gender or other grounds.194 In addition to 
establishing that the group attacked belongs to a group with a 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender 
identity, courts also link this consideration to the issue of intent, 
as the element calls for evidence that the population was 
targeted based on a number of grounds relating to the identity 
of the group. In essence, it is asking for a showing that the attack 
was driven by an intention based on the identity of the group. 
In the events concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline, the 
identity of the “group or collectivity” attacked is clear. The 
cultural heritage destroyed was significant to the people of the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, in particular, and also to the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. The sites of cultural heritage 
damaged and destroyed near Canon Ball, North Dakota on 
September 3, 2016 were located just north of the Standing Rock 
reservation,195 and the reservation is home to about half of the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s members; meaning that about 
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9,000 members of the Tribe live on the reservation and look to 
these sites in and around the reservation as part of their culture, 
religion, and heritage.196 
As for the issue of the perpetrator’s intent to target a “group 
or collectivity,” case law before the ICTY has established that 
the crime of persecution “requires evidence of a specific intent to 
discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds and that it 
falls to the Prosecution to prove that the relevant acts were 
committed with the requisite discriminatory intent.”197 The 
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Dordevic confirmed that although the 
“requisite discriminatory intent cannot be inferred directly from 
the general discriminatory nature of an attack characterised as 
a crime against humanity, however, it ‘may be inferred from 
such a context of the attack so long as, in view of the facts of the 
case, circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged 
acts substantiate the existence of such intent.’”198 The Appeals 
Chamber clarified that circumstances which may be taken into 
consideration include “the general attitude of the alleged 
perpetrator of the offence as seen through his or her 
behaviour.”199 The Appeals Chamber also noted that the 
perpetrator’s “personal motive does not preclude a perpetrator 
from also having the requisite specific intent,” explaining that 
the perpetrator might have a separate motivation for the action, 
“but at the same time also possess the intent to discriminate 
against his or her victim on political, racial, or religious 
grounds.”200 
The fact that the ICTY found that “[i]t is not sufficient for 
the accused to be aware that he or she is in fact acting in a way 
that is discriminatory,”201 but that the perpetrator must 
“consciously intend to discriminate,”202 is a hurdle to overcome 
in proving that the destruction of cultural heritage as a result of 
the pipeline’s construction is an act of persecution. What is 
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helpful to the analysis concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline is 
that, although it would be argued that the corporation officials’ 
actions were motivated by economic development to construct 
the pipeline and not to persecute the tribes affected, the ICTY 
has found that such motive does not bar a finding that the 
corporation officials “at the same time also possess the intent to 
discriminate” on the grounds of race, religion, cultural or other 
grounds.203 
In the case of the Dakota Access Pipeline, arguments could 
be made that the original routing of the pipeline demonstrates 
this intent to discriminate, as the original route passed north of 
Bismarck, North Dakota, and not by the Standing Rock 
reservation. Plaintiffs allege that the route was amended to pass 
near the reservation after surveys of the route, and residents of 
Bismarck, raised concerns about how it would affect the water 
supply for residents of Bismarck,204 and on the risk of oil spill 
from the pipeline.205 As a result of this amendment, there have 
been accusations that the change was made on the basis of race. 
It is alleged that the “risk [was] placed squarely on the Tribe,”206 
and demonstrates discriminatory actions by the corporations 
which own the pipeline and are constructing it.207 
Based on these allegations and facts I argue that specific 
discriminatory intent is present, and that it has been 
demonstrated that the Sioux Tribes, whose cultural heritage 
was damaged and destroyed, were targeted with discriminatory 
intent because the route of the pipeline was specifically planned 
to affect an area sacred to the Tribe, and therefore on the bases 
of race, ethnicity, cultural and religion, instead of affecting the 
 
 203. Prosecutor v. Dordević, supra note 201, ¶ 887. 
 204. Dakota Access, LLC, Combined Application of Dakota Access LLC for a 
Waiver or Reduction of Procedures and Time Schedules and for a Corridor 
Certificate and Route Permit, (Dec. 2014), https://psc.nd.gov/database/
documents/14-0842/001-030.pdf; see also Amy Dalrymple, Pipeline Route Plan 
First Called for Crossing North of Bismarck, BISMARCK TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/pipeline-route-plan-rst-
called-for-crossing-north-of-bismarck/article_64d053e4-8a1a-5198-a1dd-498d3
86c933c.html; Catherine Thorbecke, Why a Previously Proposed Route for the 
Dakota Access Pipeline Was Rejected, ABC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/previously-proposed-route-dakota-access-pipeline-
rejected/story?id=43274356. 
 205. Archambault Declaration of Feb. 9, 2017, supra note 37, ¶ 20. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Andrew Buncombe, North Dakota Pipeline: How it Favours White 
Community over Native Neighbours—In One Map, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 30, 
2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/north-dakota-acces
s-pipeline-protests-map-white-indigenous-latest-a7448161.html. 
2019] DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE 197 
land of the populations in Bismarck. 
4. The deprivation of a fundamental human right 
It is significant that the UNESCO Declaration of 2003 
acknowledges that, although the intent may be for the 
destruction of cultural property or heritage, an integral reality 
of this act is that “intentional destruction of cultural heritage 
constitutes a violation of human rights and may be accompanied 
by other grave human rights violations.”208 This is noted in the 
Declaration’s definition of “intentional destruction” which 
defines it as “an act intended to destroy in whole or in part 
cultural heritage, thus compromising its integrity, in a manner 
which constitutes a violation of international law or an 
unjustifiable offence to the principles of humanity and dictates 
of public conscience.”209 The definition recognizes that an 
intentional act against property or heritage cannot be separated 
from its link to human rights. 
To this, the first element of the underlying crime of 
persecution listed in the Elements of Crimes requires that a 
person or group of people are deprived of a fundamental human 
right under international law. This element identifies the first 
main hurdle to recognizing the destruction of cultural heritage 
as a crime against humanity instead of a war crime. As the 
contextual elements require, and as discussed throughout this 
article, a crime against humanity must be against persons—
”against any civilian population”210—and not against property. 
Recognizing the destruction of cultural heritage as a crime 
against persons is a departure from the original construction of 
protections to cultural property under customary international 
law which viewed property, or the state in which the object was 
located, as the object of protection, and not individuals affected 
by the harm to the cultural site.211 But, as discussed above,212 
the protection of cultural heritage has developed so that 
“[i]nternational norms relating to cultural heritage consider the 
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destruction of any nation’s cultural property as a loss and an 
injury to the collective heritage of humankind’s civilization” and 
“as a matter of public interest, and not only as part of private 
property rights.”213 The destruction of cultural heritage is, thus, 
not only a violation of the customary international law aimed at 
“preserving and safeguarding an object,”214 but is also a violation 
of guaranteed human rights for the individuals affected and “is 
a necessary and complementary approach to the 
preservation/safeguard of cultural heritage.”215 
In 2016 the Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of 
Cultural Rights emphasized the importance of cultural heritage 
from a human rights perspective,216 stating that: 
Cultural heritage is significant in the present, both as a 
message from the past and as a pathway to the future. 
Viewed from a human rights perspective, it is important 
not only in itself, but also in relation to its human 
dimension, in particular its significance for individuals 
and groups and their identity and development 
processes. Cultural heritage is to be understood as the 
resources enabling the cultural identification and 
development processes of individuals and groups, which 
they, implicitly or explicitly, wish to transmit to future 
generations.217 
Viewing the protection of cultural heritage from the 
perspective that the object of protection includes individual 
people and groups, highlights that the protection of cultural 
heritage is an extension of international human rights law.218 
Human rights law protects certain fundamental human rights 
and the “intentional destruction [of cultural heritage] . . . [has] 
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adverse consequences on . . . human rights.”219 I review 
fundamental rights of individuals protected under international 
human rights law, which are affected by acts against cultural 
heritage, below. 
When examining the human rights which the international 
community has recognized through international human rights 
documents, the most relevant right is the human right of people 
to their own culture. This right is set out in human rights 
instruments including Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which guarantees the right “to participate in the 
cultural life of the community,”220 and Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which notes 
the right to “enjoy [one’s] own culture” in relation to the rights 
of “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities.”221 Article 15 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), also specifically notes an individual’s right to cultural 
heritage. This provision “recognize[s] the right of everyone: (a) 
To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection 
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”222 
In a General Comment on Article 15 of the ICESCR, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explained 
that this right creates an obligation for State parties to respect, 
protect and fulfil the right “to have access to their own cultural 
and linguistic heritage and to that of others,”223 but also creates 
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an obligation “requiring States to take measures to prevent third 
parties from interfering” with this right.224 
It is evident that when sites of great significance to a 
population’s cultural heritage are extensively damaged or 
destroyed, the population will be denied the right to access their 
culture or to take part in their culture. For the Tribes affected 
by the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline—specifically 
those affected by the construction and grading which occurred 
on the land near Canon Ball on September 3, 2016—the effects 
included the loss of a stone structured used for religious worship 
and spiritual guidance as well as the destruction of grave sites 
of the Tribe’s ancestors. 
As noted above, stone structures are important to the Tribes’ 
culture and religion as a place where individuals find “spiritual 
connection through prayer and commitment at these stone 
features,”225 and are evidence of a “highly structured spiritual 
walk of life practice by” the members of the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe.226 Their destruction would deprive the people of the Tribe 
the ability to practice these rituals, and would therefore 
constitute a clear violation of the right to access, and take part 
in, one’s culture.227 Likewise, the way in which a group of people 
honors and grieves its dead is a highly cultural and religious 
practice. For the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, some members 
were buried at the site of the stone structure where they 
worshipped throughout their lives, and burial grounds were 
often located towards the surface of the ground with rock cairns 
placed on top.228 The fact that a number of the grave sites were 
of important chiefs to the Tribes further touches on the Tribes’ 
protection of its cultural heritage.229 
After the land near Canon Ball was affected by grading on 
September 3, 2016, it was submitted that any site “that was in 
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the pipeline corridor [was] destroyed.”230 It was reported that 
grave sites were significantly disturbed, and the Tribe requested 
permission to visit the site of grading to “look for human 
remains” and “rebury relatives.”231 The destruction to these 
stone structures and grave sites is a deprivation of the Tribe 
members’ right to practice and access their culture. 
In addition, the Committee’s commentary on a State’s duty 
to protect the right to cultural heritage under Article 15 is of 
further importance to the examination of the events concerning 
the Dakota Access Pipeline. The Committee explained that a 
State’s obligation to prevent third parties from interfering in the 
right to cultural life includes the obligation for States and third 
parties to respect and protect the cultural heritage of 
marginalised groups and indigenous peoples against economic 
development and corporations.232 General Comment 21 explains 
that there is an obligation to: 
(b) Respect and protect cultural heritage of all groups 
and communities, in particular the most disadvantaged 
and marginalized individuals and groups, in economic 
development and environmental policies and 
programmes; 
Particular attention should be paid to the adverse 
consequences of globalization, undue privatization of 
goods and services, and deregulation on the right to 
participate in cultural life. 
(c) Respect and protect the cultural productions of 
indigenous peoples, including their traditional 
knowledge, natural medicines, folklore, rituals and other 
forms of expression; 
This includes protection from illegal or unjust 
exploitation of their lands, territories and resources by 
State entities or private or transnational enterprises and 
corporations.233 
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These provisions are particularly relevant to the Dakota 
Access Pipeline, and set out that the United States has an 
obligation to protect the “cultural productions” of the Tribes such 
as the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe, against “unjust exploitation of their lands, territories and 
resources by State entities or private or transnational 
enterprises and corporations.”234 In this case, the right of these 
“indigenous peoples” to access and take part in their culture was 
not protected, and therefore was violated. 
The destruction of cultural heritage is also a violation to the 
right to religion.235 Human rights instruments such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,236 
European Convention on Human Rights,237 American 
Convention on Human Rights,238 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights,239 and Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights240 all include the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion and to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, 
teaching, practice or observation241 for all populations including 
minority populations.242 The destruction of cultural heritage or 
property of importance to a population’s religious practice 
represents a violation of this right because the cultural heritage 
“constitutes a representation of both a religious belief and of the 
cultural identity of a people.”243 When cultural heritage or 
property of a religious nature such as churches, shrines, temples, 
or other sites used in the worship of a population, are destroyed, 
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this removes the population’s ability to practice its right to 
religion.244 
The destruction of stone structures important to the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe is an example of the destruction of 
religious sites which violates the Tribe members’ ability to 
practice their spiritual and religious beliefs. This is because the 
stone structures are closely tied to the Tribe members’ “spiritual 
walk of life practice”.245 When these sites are damaged or 
destroyed “it destroys the spiritual connection” these individuals 
have to the sites and therefore to their religious and spiritual 
practice.246 Therefore, the destruction of stone structures near 
Canon Ball deprives the people of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
of not only their place of worship but also of their ability to 
practice. 
Likewise, the human right to self-determination could also 
be violated by the destruction of cultural heritage. The right to 
self-determination is established in such international human 
rights instruments as the International Covenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.247 Cultural heritage has been 
recognized by the International Criminal Court as playing “a 
central role in the way communities define themselves and bond 
together, and how they identify with their past and contemplate 
their future.”248 With cultural heritage constituting a central 
part in how an individual decides to lead his or her life, its 
destruction “represents an irreplaceable loss”249 to an 
individual’s ability to determine certain aspects of how they will 
lead their life, making its destruction a violation of an 
individual’s right to self-determination. This is true for the 
communities’ right as a whole to determine and express its 
identity as well. 
Much like the deprivation of the right to religion, the loss of 
sites and objects which are critical to the practice of the 
historical, religious and cultural heritage, prevent individuals, 
and the larger community, of the ability to decide for themselves 
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how they will follow these traditions and spiritual practices. For 
example, as stone structures are the necessary ‘portal’ to make 
a spiritual connection through prayer, their destruction would 
deprive individuals of the ability to practice this structured 
spiritual practice.250 This destruction or damage would therefore 
constitute a violation of the right to self-determination. 
The destruction of cultural heritage could be considered a 
violation of the right to education depending on the nature of the 
site destroyed. The right to education is enshrined in human 
rights instruments such as the International Covenant of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, European Convention on 
Human Rights, and African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.251 If the destroyed cultural heritage site was in a library 
or a place of religious or cultural teaching, then this act would 
impair or remove the ability to learn and would thus constitute 
a violation of the right to education.252 
For the Tribes whose cultural heritage was affected by the 
Dakota Access Pipeline, it is recognized that these sites are of 
cultural importance, but also of “historical significance;” noting 
that their destruction severs the “connection to [the Tribe 
members’] history.”253 As highlighted by the ICC, the loss of such 
sites “deprive a community of its . . . memory, as well as the 
physical testimony of its past,” and removes the ability to 
“transmit its values and knowledge to future generations.”254 
Therefore, it could be argued that destruction and damage to 
these sites of historical significance deprive Tribe members of 
the ability to learn about the history of their culture. 
Last, it has been recognized that the protection of cultural 
heritage and property “cannot be separated from the protection 
of human life;”255 highlighting the guarantee under 
international human rights law to the right to life. The 
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fundamental right to life is established in such international 
human rights instruments as the ICCPR, Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and American 
Convention on Human Rights.256 
The destruction of cultural heritage or property has been 
extensively linked to human life with commentary that “cultural 
heritage enables us to identify ourselves as ‘humankind’” and 
finding that “cultural heritage is essential to the life of the 
human being.”257 If cultural heritage is recognized as the 
“connection to what makes us men and women” and “that which 
makes us human,”258 and is essential to transmitting these 
“values and knowledge to future generations,”259 then there 
could be an argument that its destruction is a violation to these 
fundamental human rights. This conclusion was noted in Judge 
Cançado Trindade’s separate opinion in the case of Cambodia v. 
Thailand before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).260 The 
separate opinion noted that the Court took into “account not only 
the territory at issue, but, jointly, the people on territory” in 
regards to the subject of the Temple of Preah Veihear and in 
doing so “encompassed the human right[] to life” in its decision 
and consideration.261 
The argument is tested by findings in the ICJ Genocide case 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia which concluded that the 
destruction of cultural heritage on its own does not fit within the 
definition of genocide under international criminal law. In this 
case, it was argued that “destruction of historical, cultural and 
religious heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina” was “an essential 
part of the policy of ethnic purification” and was “an attempt to 
wipe out the traces of [the] very existence” of the Bosnian 
Muslims.262 While the Court found that such an act did not fall 
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under the legal definition of genocide as “the definition of acts of 
genocide is limited to those seeking the physical or biological 
destruction of a group,” it did find that “such destruction may be 
highly significant inasmuch as it is directed to the elimination of 
all traces of the cultural or religious presence of a group”263 and 
endorsed the ICTY’s finding in the Krstic case which stated that 
“where there is physical or biological destruction there are often 
simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and 
symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks which may 
legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically 
destroy the group.”264 Therefore, while jurisprudence from the 
ICJ excludes an argument that the destruction of cultural 
heritage rise to the level of proving an international crime 
against a human life under international criminal law, there is 
still the possibility of an argument that such acts fit under 
international human rights norms. 
It is recognized that applying human rights principles of the 
right to life to events where a human’s physical life has not been 
harmed is a difficult argument to make and prove. Here, viewing 
the destruction of significant sites of cultural heritage as a 
violation of the right to life of these Tribe members is an 
argument on what defines life, and whether life also includes the 
things that make us human.265 It pushes the envelope to a more 
progressive approach to the interpretation of the right to life, but 
in this way could support the development of the protection of 
cultural heritage in terms of its human dimension. Though it 
might be difficult to prove that a violation to the right to life has 
been committed in relation to the pipeline, it is helpful to 
consider how the sites of cultural heritage and property are 
critical to their way of life. 
As a final note, it is acknowledged that there is an argument 
for a hierarchy of human rights whereby the violation of some 
human rights could be considered to have more gravity than 
others.266 In this sense, the jurisprudence before the ICTY on the 
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crime against humanity of persecution found that “acts of 
persecutions, considered separately or together, should reach 
the level of gravity of other crimes listed in Article 5 of the 
Statute.”267 
Relating this gravity assessment to the violation of human 
rights, the ICTY jurisprudence offered examples of those rights 
which, when violated, would rise to the level of persecution. It 
found that there was “no doubt that serious bodily and mental 
harm and infringements upon individual freedom may be 
characterised as persecution” stating that “infringements of the 
elementary and inalienable rights of man, which are “the right 
to life, liberty and the security of person,” the right not to be 
“held in slavery or servitude,” the right not to “be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment” and the right not to be “subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile” . . . by their very essence may 
constitute persecution when committed on discriminatory 
grounds.”268 However, it went on to find that these were not the 
only violations to human rights which could rise to the level of 
persecution as a crime against humanity and that “acts rendered 
serious not by their apparent cruelty but by the discrimination 
they seek to instil within humankind” such as “confiscation or 
destruction of private dwellings or businesses, symbolic 
buildings or means of subsistence belonging to” a specific group 
could reach the gravity required to be considered persecution as 
crime against humanity.269 The Appeals Chamber recognised 
that there might be questions about whether acts against 
property and not directly against a person, but which affect a 
group of peoples’ human rights, may rise to the level of crimes 
against humanity, and found that “the destruction of property, 
depending on the nature and extent of the destruction, may 
constitute a crime of persecutions of equal gravity to other 
crimes listed in Article 5 of the Statute.”270 
Based on the facts concerning the pipeline, an argument 
could be made that the destruction of cultural heritage and 
property associated with the construction of the pipeline near 
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Cannon Ball violated a series of fundamental human rights of 
the affected tribes, and that though these acts are against 
symbolic objects and property to the tribe members, when 
considered together, they have a discriminatory effect which 
rises to the level of persecution as a crime against humanity. 
5. Connection with another act in Article 7 
Finally, the ICC’s document on the Elements of Crimes 
states that in order to qualify as a crime against humanity of 
persecution the conduct must be “committed in connection with 
any act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”271 The 
requirement for linking acts of persecution to other crimes under 
the Statute is a requirement that is unique to the ICC. The ICTY 
specifically rejected this requirement, and commented that 
although the “ICC Statute reflects customary international law 
in abolishing the nexus between crimes against humanity and 
armed conflict,” this requirement is “not consonant with 
customary international law.”272 It has instead been explained 
that the requirement was added to prevent persecution’s use as 
an “auxiliary offence.”273 The Trial Chamber in Kupreskic 
acknowledged that the requirement at the ICC “may be 
indicative of the opinio juris of many States,” but that the ICTY 
“rejected the notion that persecution must be linked to crimes 
found elsewhere in the Statute” of the ICTY.274 
In addition, the Trial Chamber’s comments in Kupreskic 
suggested that the requirement “might easily be circumvented 
by charging persecution in connection with ‘other inhumane acts 
of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’ under 
Article 7(1)(k).”275 
For the destruction or damage of cultural heritage, it 
depends on the facts of the situation, as the destruction of 
cultural heritage is not always committed in conjunction with 
other crimes such as murder, torture or rape, to name a few. 
However, for the situation concerning the Dakota Access 
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Pipeline, the treatment of activists and protesters 
demonstrating against the construction of the pipeline and 
against the destruction of the cultural heritage at issue, could be 
viewed as constituting another ‘inhumane act’ causing great 
suffering or serious physical or mental injury. 
There have been reports that activists and protesters, 
including members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, have been physically abused 
through excessive force, including the use of rubber bullets, and 
unlawfully arrested en masse and mistreated in detention.276 
The reports have resulted in the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues initiating an investigation into the reported 
abuses,277 and in the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples expressing concern about the action of the 
authorities against the protesters.278 
Therefore, there is a strong case to argue that these abuses 
against members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and the activists who support their 
interests, would constitute other inhumane acts under Article 
7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, and would provide the connection to 
another act which is required to bring a claim for the crime of 
persecution. 
B. THE CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS OF A CRIME AGAINST 
HUMANITY 
Last, upon considering the requirements necessary to allege 
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that the destruction of cultural heritage could constitute a crime 
of persecution during times of peace under the Rome Statute, it 
must be considered whether the crime rises to the level of a crime 
against humanity. 
The ICC’s document ‘Elements of Crimes’ sets out the 
elements for all crimes listed in the Rome Statute for which the 
ICC has jurisdiction. This includes the elements for each listed 
underlying crime under Article 7, including the underlying 
crime of persecution. When listing the crime against humanity 
of persecution the document notes that “[t]he last two elements 
for each crime against humanity describe the context in which 
the conduct must take place . . . clarify[ing] that the contextual 
elements for a crime against humanity are listed last.279 
Therefore, the contextual elements to make the crime of 
persecution a crime against humanity are listed as element 5 
and 6 under the elements for Article 7(1)(h), and require that: 
5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or 
intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population.280 
The definition of “attack” as set out at Article 7(2)(a) further 
provides the contextual element that the attack is committed 
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy 
to commit such attack.”281 
The contextual elements to a crime against humanity were 
further reviewed in the Prosecution’s decision to initiate an 
investigation into the destruction of cultural heritage in Mali. 
Here it was noted that to establish a crime against humanity, 
the contextual elements which must be proven include: “(i) an 
attack against any civilian population; (ii) a State or 
organizational policy; (iii) an attack of a widespread or 
systematic nature; (iv) a nexus between the individual act and 
the attack; and (v) the accused’s knowledge of the attack.”282 
First, it must be noted that for the purpose of this analysis 
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concerning cultural heritage, this article sets out the contextual 
elements required for proving the commission of a crime against 
humanity of persecution but will not examine at length the case 
law defining and clarifying the requirements of the contextual 
elements which are common to all crimes against humanity. As 
it is necessary and helpful to set out what contextual elements 
are required and apply it to the case at hand, as done briefly 
below, the focus of this article will remain on how the underlying 
crime of persecution can be applied to situations where cultural 
heritage is damage or destroyed during times of peace. 
Therefore, in relation to the events concerning the Dakota 
Access Pipeline, it can be argued that all contextual elements for 
a crime against humanity are present. To start, the nature of the 
group or collectivity—the Native American tribes such as the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe—have been discussed above and make clear that these 
Tribes are a civilian population.283 Further, Article 7(2)(a) states 
that an “attack” only must be “a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts,”284 and the Elements of Crimes 
clarifies that the “acts need not constitute a military attack.”285 
As detailed above,286 the actions taken by the construction 
corporations on the pipeline are indeed a course of conduct which 
has repeatedly resulted in the commission of attacks on the 
cultural heritage which either harm, damage or destroy the sites 
and objects. 
The nexus between the act of the potential perpetrator and 
the attack, as well as the perpetrator’s knowledge of the attack 
can also be said to be demonstrated in this case. As discussed in 
detail above, 287 the corporations involved in construction are 
connected to acts which resulted in the destruction of cultural 
heritage, particularly through steps taken to prepare the land 
for construction and the actual construction of the pipeline. The 
corporation’s knowledge about the attack can be established in 
that they were made aware of the damage construction could, 
and had caused, during, among other things, the protests of the 
 
 283. See supra pp. 163–68. 
 284. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(a). 
 285. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/9-19, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶ 80 (Mar. 31, 2010); ICC, ELEMENTS OF 
CRIMES, supra note 18, art. 7. 
 286. See, e.g., supra pp. 191–97. 
 287. Id. 
212 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 28:1 
tribes and legal actions taken to argue that the pipeline would 
damage or destroy important cultural sites and objects or to 
highlight the damage and destruction caused after 
construction.288 
As for the requirement of a State or organizational policy, 
jurisprudence before the ICC has given guidance on what is 
necessary to set out that an attack was committed “pursuant to 
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack.”289 Criteria identified for establishing a policy 
include that:  
a) it must be thoroughly organised and follow a regular 
pattern;  
b) it must be conducted in furtherance of a common policy 
involving public or private resources;  
c) it can be implemented either by groups who govern a 
specific territory or by an organisation that has the 
capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population; and  
d) it need not be explicitly defined or formalised (indeed, 
an attack which is planned, directed or organised—as 
opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of violence—will 
satisfy this particular criterion).290  
As for the term ‘organizational’, ICC jurisprudence sets out 
that it is not “the formal nature of a group and the level of its 
organization” that determines whether the requirements for an 
organization under Article 7(2)(a) are established but instead 
“whether a group has the capability to perform acts which 
infringe on basic human values.”291 
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In the case of the Dakota Access Pipeline, the policy of the 
organizations which own, construct and operate the pipeline has 
been extensively set out.292 The corporations involved in the 
construction of the pipeline followed a regular pattern as a result 
of the common policy to construct the pipeline, by way of private 
funds of the corporations involved. This common policy 
effectuated a regular pattern of progressive acts taken during 
the construction process which destroyed the cultural heritage 
of the tribes located along the pipeline. Furthermore, the license 
obtained by corporations from the US Government to construct 
the pipeline and the finalised plans for routing of the pipeline 
establish that the there was a formalized policy and that the 
corporations in this case maintained the capacity to take steps 
which would attack the cultural heritage of the tribes; thus also 
demonstrating fulfilment of the definition of ‘organization’ under 
Article 7(2)(1). 
This leaves consideration of whether the acts at hand were 
widespread and systematic in nature. The term ‘widespread’ 
speaks to the scale of the attack and is defined by the ICC as 
“the large scale nature of the attack, which should be massive, 
frequent, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness 
and directed against a multiplicity of victims.”293 The term 
‘systematic’ refers to the nature of the attack and is defined by 
the ICC as referring to the “organised nature of the acts of 
violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.”294 
As noted above, reports on the impact of constructing the 
pipeline have detailed that construction would affect lands 
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sacred to Native American Tribes along many parts of the 
pipeline, and would affect tribes other than the Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.295 In addition to 
allegations of serious damage and destruction of cultural and 
religious property and heritage to the local Tribes, it has been 
argued that the pipeline would negatively impact the 
environmental integrity of the water sources near the pipeline, 
such as with the Missouri River and Lake Oahe, and would 
therefore affect the Tribe’s cultural and spiritual relationship 
with these water sources.296 The events which resulted in the 
destruction and damage to cultural heritage on September 3, 
2016 near Canon Ball are only one instance highlighted, and 
therefore the number of sites affected as a result of the 
construction of the pipeline demonstrate the widespread and 
systematic nature of the harm—i.e. the widespread or large 
scale of the continuous and numerous attacks on cultural 
heritage through construction along the entire pipeline, and the 
systematic or organised nature of the attacks through the plans 
to repeatedly take steps in the construction process which would 
harm cultural heritage. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the contextual elements for 
a crime against humanity can be established in this case, and 
the destruction and damage to cultural heritage of importance 
to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribes could rise to the level of a crime against humanity of 
persecution under Article 7 (1)(h) of the Rome Statute. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Above, it is proposed that a person most responsible for 
destroying or damaging cultural heritage or property during a 
time of peace may be held individually criminally responsible as 
having committed the crime against humanity of persecution, 
specifically as set out in Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. The 
argument is made that such an application of Article 7(1)(h) is 
compatible with international criminal law, international 
human rights law and is supported by the development of 
customary international law regarding the protection of cultural 
property and heritage. 
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In making this argument, the article examined the elements 
which would need to be proven in order find that an act of 
destruction or damage to cultural property or heritage is a crime 
against humanity of persecution before the ICC finding that, to 
apply Article 7(1)(h) it would have to be established first, that a 
site or object of cultural heritage or property, not used for 
military purposes, was destroyed or damaged extensively as a 
result of the perpetrator’s actions. Second, it must be 
demonstrated that the perpetrator intended to destroy or 
damage the site or object extensively or had knowledge of the 
likelihood that the actions would result in such harm and 
nevertheless acted with reckless disregard. Third, the cultural 
heritage or property which was damaged or destroyed must be 
linked to a civilian population by explaining how the cultural 
heritage or property was associated with the civilian population 
and therefore establishing that the attack against the civilian 
population was essentially targeting the group or collectivity 
based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender or other grounds. Fourth, it must be shown that the harm 
caused by the destruction or damage of the cultural heritage 
resulted in the deprivation of a grave and fundamental human 
right of the group. Fifth, the attack against the cultural heritage 
or property must be connected to another act within Article 7, 
and last, the attack must be shown to be part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against the civilian population. 
This article concludes that the events concerning the Dakota 
Access Pipeline’s construction, and in particular the events near 
Canon Ball, North Dakota on September 3, 2016, which resulted 
in the destruction and damage of cultural heritage and property 
such as stone structures and burial grounds, could rise to the 
level of, and fit within the definition of, a crime against 
humanity of persecution under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome 
Statute, and as a result, corporations responsible for the 
ownership and construction of the pipeline could be vulnerable 
to investigation or prosecution before the ICC. 
 
